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	Abstract	
The	human	body	was	made	legible	long	ago.		But	what	of	the	human	mind?		Is	it	possible	to	‘read’	the	mind,	for	one	human	being	to	know	what	another	is	thinking	or	feeling,	their	beliefs	and	intentions.		And	if	I	can	read	your	mind,	how	about	others	–	could	our	authorities,	in	the	criminal	justice	system	or	the	security	services?	Some	developments	in	contemporary	neuroscience	suggest	the	answer	to	this	question	is	‘yes’.				While	philosophers	continue	to	debate	the	mind-brain	problem,	a	range	of	novel	technologies	of	brain	imaging	have	been	used	to	argue	that	specific	mental	states,	and	even	specific	thoughts,	can	be	identified	by	characteristic	patterns	of	brain	activation;	this	has	led	some	to	propose	their	use	in	practices	ranging	from	lie	detection	and	security	screening		to	the	assessment	of	brain	activity	in	persons	in	persistent	vegetative	states.		This	paper	reviews	the	history	of	these	developments,	sketches	their	scientific	and	technical	bases,	considers	some	of	the	epistemological	and	ontological	mutations	involved,	explores	the	ecological	niches	where	they	have	found	a	hospitable	environment,	and	considers	some	implications	of	this	materialization	of	the	readable,	knowable,	transparent	mind.	
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1	
"Le	cerveau	c'est	l'écran"		Gilles	Deleuze	1	
	
Do	you	know	what	I	am	thinking?	Do	I	know	what	you	are	thinking?		Could	I	ever	really	know	what’s	in	your	mind	-	your	thoughts,		your	intentions,	the	images	playing	in	that	internal	cinema?		And	if	I	could	know	this,	what	about	others	–	what	about	those	who	govern	us,	our	authorities?		Could	they	go	beyond	knowing	our	intentions	prospectively	from	our	statements	or	retrospectively	from	our	actions,	to	predicting	our	actions	from	some	kind	of	prior	knowledge	of	our	thoughts?		And	could	that	prior	knowledge	arise,	not	from	the	exterior	comportment	of	our	body	or	the	expressions	on	our	face,	or	from	psychological	investigations	probing	our	state	of	mind,	but	from	the	brain	itself?			Is	it,	could	it	ever	be	possible	to	‘read’		thoughts	in	the	human	brain?2		Might	we,	as	some	believe,	be	“sleepwalking	into	a	Minority	Report	society”	where	‘brain	reading’	is	deployed	to	identify	potentially	dangerous	individuals	–	pre-criminals	-	within	those	practices	of	prediction,	prevention,	preclusion	and	pre-emption	that	have	become	so	salient	in	our	current	security	states.	3			
In	the	US,	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	is	already	piloting	a	programme	known	as	FAST		-	the	Future	Attribute	Screening	Programme	–	to	identify	individuals	who	harbour	terrorist	intentions.4		A	report	in	the	journal	Nature	–	accompanied	by	the	almost	obligatory	reference	to	the	film	Minority	Report	-	was	entitled	“Terrorist	‘pre-crime’	detector	field	tested	in	the	United	States”	(Weinberger,	2011).		FAST	does	not,	in	fact,		seek	to	read	brains,	but	focuses	upon	physiological	indicators	assessed	at	a	distance	-	measures	of	such	functions	as	heart	rates	and	the	steadiness	of	the	gaze	-	to	try	to	predict	intentions.	This	has	not	stopped	some	from	dreaming	of	a	time	when	more	direct	technologies	would	be	deployed	to	identify	‘malintent’	–	technologies	that	do	not	rely	on	measuring	surrogate	proxies	of	intent	in	the	body,		but	go	straight	to	the	brain.			
	In	2007,	there	was	a	flurry	of	publicity	about	some	experiments	by	John-Dylan	Haynes	and	his	group	where	fMRI	scanning	appeared	to	enable	the	researchers	to	identify	the	intentions	of	their	subjects	before	they	acted	(Haynes,	Sakai	et	al.,	2007).		The	headline	in	the	Guardian	in	February	of	that	year		read	“The	brain	scan	that	can	read	people’s	intentions”		and	Haynes	commented	“Using	the	scanner,	we	could	look	around	the	brain	for	this	information	and	read	out	something	that	from	the	outside	there's	no	way	you	could	possibly	tell	is	in	there.	It's	like	shining	a	torch	around,	looking	for	writing	on	a	wall."5	And	in	July	2014,	a	BBC	website	publicized	the	work	of	Jack	Gallant	and	his	group	under	the	headline	“I	built	a	brain	decoder”:	“What	are	you	looking	at?	Scientist	Jack	Gallant	can	find	out	by	decoding	your	thoughts.”6			
What	has	happened	here	to	those	age	old	distinctions	between	brain	and	mind	that	have	so	troubled	our	philosophers?7			Of	course,	humans	have	always	had	their	methods	to	discern	the	beliefs,	feelings	and	intentions	of	others.			Their	readings	of	the	eyes,	faces,	voices,	gestures,	comportment	of	others	–	usually	through	methods	that	are	not	conscious	or	calculated	-	appears	to	underpin	sympathy,	empathy,	compassion,	love,	as	well	as	suspicion,	and	fear	and	no	doubt	much	else.	These	abilities	have	been	the	stuff	of	lives	and	of	stories	of	lives	for	millennia.		The	facility	of	most	humans	to	read	the	minds	of	others	to	detect	deception	and	guilt	is	utilised	in	practices	of	investigation	and	systems	of	criminal	justice,	and	taken	for	granted	in	crime	thrillers	and	novels	of	betrayal	in	everyday	life,	in	love	and	marriage,	in	espionage	and	war.		Over	the	last	twenty	years,	developments	in	the	brain	sciences	–	in	the	field	known	as	‘social	cognition’	-		have	sought	to	uncover	the	neural	mechanisms	that	underpin	–	or	‘subserve’	as	they	often	say	–	such	ascriptions	of	contents	to	other	minds.8	Arguments	that	there	are	evolved	brain	regions	that	are	specialised	for	reading	the	intentions	and	emotions	of	others,	and	indeed	‘feeling	their	pain’,	are	moving	out	of	the	laboratory,	not	only	into	the	psychiatric	clinic	–	explaining	disorders	such	as	autism	in	terms	of	anomalies	in	the	mind	reading	capacities	of	those	diagnosed9	–		but	also		–			hesitantly	
	and	often	controversially	-	into	forensic	psychiatry,	notably	in	debates	about	the	neural	basis	of	‘psychopathy’.10		
But	while	social	neuroscientists	have	sought	to	establish	the	neurobiological	basis	for	the	human	capacity	to	read	intentions,	beliefs	or	emotions	in	the	minds	of	others,	and	to	characterise	the	pathologies	that	result	from	brain	damage	or	other	anomalies	in	such	capacities,	they	have	usually	stopped	short	of	suggesting	that	another	–	your	conspecific,	your	spouse,	your	boss,	your	government	–	can	‘read’	your	brain	to	access	the	specific	
content	of	your	thoughts	or	of	your	memories,	the	precise	details	of	your	beliefs,	the	nature	of	your	intentions,	the	exact	form	of	your	desires.11				As	far	as	memories	are	concerned,		every	student	of	neuroscience	knows	of	Karl	Lashley’s	search	for	the	location	of	the	elusive	‘engram’	in	rodents	(Lashley,	1950),	and	Wilder	Penfield’s	experiences	with	his	epileptic	patients	who	seemed	to	recall	some	memories	when	certain	locations	on	their	cortex	were	electrically	stimulated	during	operations	to	ablate	their	focal	lesions	(Penfield,	1952).		The	existence	of	identifiable	cerebral	locations	of	such	memory	traces	–	even	in	rats	let	alone	in	humans	-	has	long	remained	contested.		Recently,	however,	a	number	of	neuroscientists	have	claimed	that	they	are	able	to	use	neurotechnologies	to	identify		not	just	memories,	but	also	specific	thoughts,	beliefs	and	intentions	in	the	brain	itself.				Although	most	of	the	researchers	resist	the	application	of	the	term,	popular	reports	have	been	quick	to	dub	these	endeavours	‘mind	reading’.12	
These	attempts	to	identify	thoughts	and	memories	in	the	brain	itself	are	directed	towards		practical	applications	in	diverse	areas:		security	and	crime	control,	the	development	of	prostheses	for	military	personnel	injured	in	battle,	and	clinical	sites	where	patients	are	unable	to	express	their	thoughts	and	intentions	in	normal	ways.13			They	are	clearly	‘dual	use’	technologies,	that	is	to	say	they	can	be	utilised	for	civilian	and	therapeutic	purposes,	as	well	as	in	military	and	security	practices,	in	surveillance,	warfighting	and	even	mind-control.		However,	over	and	beyond	these	specific	
	deployments,	and	the	familiar	ethical	conundrums	that	they	generate,	I	want	to	suggest	that	this	new	capacity	to	‘read’	mental	events	in	the	tissues	of	the	brain,	may	have	consequences	for	our	very	understanding	of	what	we	are	as	humans	–	that	is	to	say,	it	is,	potentially,	an	event	in	historical	ontology.			Philosophers,	psychologists	and	philosophically	minded	neuroscientists	have	long	debated	issues	of	dualism	and	materialism,	and	that	debate	will	undoubtedly	continue.		Critical	scholars	from	science	and	technology	studies	and	elsewhere	have	pointed	to	the	fact		that	much	contemporary	neuroscience	attributes	capacities	to	the	brain	on	the	basis	of	experimental	findings	in	highly	artificial	laboratory	contexts	(e.g.	Cohn,	2008;	Cohn,	2008),		without	addressing	the	reality	that	brains	are	constitutively	embodied,	saturated	by	and	dependent	upon	their	constant	transactions	with	inputs	from	without.		They	have	argued,	correctly	in	my	view,	that	bodies	are	in	and	of	the	world	with	all	that	this	implies,14	and	that	‘thought’	is	impossible	to	understand	without	recognising	its	dependence	on	a	complex	transpersonal	milieu	of	language,	meaning	and	culture.15		Sociologists	of	‘expectations’	have	pointed	to	the	characteristic	overclaiming	that	accompanies	many	new	technological	developments,	and	rightly	argued	that	many	such	developments	fail	in	translation	from	the	purified	domain	of	the	lab	to	the	messy	and	complex	external	world	(e.g.	Hopkins,	Martin	et	al.,	2007).		But	despite	the	many	unresolved	quandaries	that	haunt	those	debates,	and	the	many	criticisms	that	can	be,	and	have	been,	levelled	against	them,	this	new	‘materialist’	ontology	of	thought	is	taking	shape,		not	through	a	philosophical	resolution	of	the	age	old	dilemmas,		but	through	developments	in	technology.			Notwithstanding	the	explanatory	gap	–	the	daunting	gulf	that	exists	between	a	knowledge	of	molecular	events	in	the	neurons	of	the	brain	and	an	explanation	of	how	the	mental	events	that	are	‘subserved’	arise	–	and	despite	all	the	critiques	-		these	technologies	embody	and	enact	the	premise	that	the	brain	is	the	place	where	mental	events	are	located	and	that	there	must,	therefore,	be	material	traces	of	such	mental	events	in	the	brain	itself.		And	if	those	traces	exist,	it	must	be	possible	-	both	
	in	principle	and	now	it	seems	in	practice	-	to	make	them	legible.			My	aim	in	this	paper	is	description	and	not	critique:	it	is	to	characterize	these	ways	of	thinking	and	to	consider	the	mutation	in	our	understandings	of	the	human	to	which	they	are	contributing.	
Seeing	the	mind	
These	days,	phrenology,	the	attempt	to	read	human	characteristics	by	measuring	the	contours	of	the	skull,	ascribing	different	mental	faculties	to	specific	areas	and	measuring	them	by	assessing	the	enlargements	or	indentations	in	each,	is	usually	ridiculed	as		a	pseudoscience.		In	the	form	popularized	by	Spurzheim	and	Combe,	it	probably	deserves	this	fate.		But	as	proposed	by	Franz	Joseph	Gall,	it	entailed	two	theses	with	lasting	impact	on	the	sciences	of	mind	and	brain	(Gall,	1810).		First,	that	the	brain	was	the	seat	of	the	mind.		Second	that	the	brain	was	organized	in		such	a	way	that	different	mental	functions	were	located	in	specific	areas.		These	theses	were	heretical:	despite	Gall’s	famous	Spinozist	attempt	to	reconcile	his	views	with	those	of	the	Catholic	Church	–		as	in	his	famous	phrase	“God	and	the	brain.	Nothing	but	God	and	the	brain”	(Rieber,	2006)	–	his	teachings	were	banned	in	his	native	Austria	because	of	their	materialism	and	he	was	forced	to	flee	to	Paris.			But	the	thesis	of	localisation	remained	foundational	for	later	brain	researchers	(Hagner,	1997;	Hagner,	2001;	Hagner	and	Borck,	2001).		Nineteenth	century	neurologists	–	Broca,	Wernicke,	Fleschig	and	many	more	-		dissected	the	brains	of	those	who	had	suffered	brain	injuries,	criminals	and	the	mad	in	the	attempt	to	find	in	the	dead	brain	the	cerebral	roots	of	their	mental	pathologies	in	life.		They	tried,	with	some	success,	to	correlate	disorders	of	speech,	thought,	memory	or	conduct	shown	in	life	with	lesions	in	the	post-mortem	brain,	but	were	less	successful	when	they	sought	the	corporeal	signs	of	insanity	in	the	tissues	–	in	the	shape	or	size	of	the	brain,	the	configuration	of	its	parts	and	folds,	or	the	presence	of	lesions	in	the	nerve	fibres	or	the	white	or	grey	matter.16		Broca,	like	Gall,	was	a	materialist,	a	founder	member	of	the	Society	for	Mutual	Autopsy	which	examined	the	brains	of	the	wise	and	virtuous	in	the	
	attempt	to	identify	the	cerebral	underpinnings	of	their	greatness.		Jennifer	Michael	Hecht’s	account	of	this	work	makes	clear	the	risky	materialism	espoused	by	these	figures	who	are	sometimes	mocked	as	naïve	or	malign	(Hecht,	1997;	Hecht,	2003).	17	
But	the	living	brain,	protected	by	the	opaque	skull,	remained	invisible	–	it	could	be	imagined	but	it	could	not	be	seen.		In	the	early	years	of	the	twentieth	century,	a	number	of	clinicians	attempted	to	render	the	living	brain	amenable	to	visualization	by	X-Rays	(cf.	Kevles,	1997).		The	first	attempts	–	by	Walter	Dandy	and	then	by	Egas	Moniz	-		worked	by	injection	of	air,	or	dye,	into	the	ventricles	of	the	brain,	or	the	blood	vessels	within	it	–	a	painful	process	but	one	that	could	reveal	gross	abnormalities,	lesions	or	tumours	and	so	had	a	limited	but	important	clinical	role		(Dandy,	1918;	Moniz,	1933)	.18		But	from	that	point	on,	a	series	of	techniques	were	developed	that	seemed	to	be	able	to	render	visible	the	living	brain	in	action.		The	first	measures	of		brain	activity	that	could	be	made	‘non-invasively’	without	piercing	the	skull	were	electrical.		The	idea	that	there	were	electrical	currents	in	the	brain	was	given	technological	form	in	the	1920s	by	Hans	Berger	with	his	invention	of	electroencephalography:	his	claim	in	1929	that	one	could	identify	characteristic	rhythms,	waves	and	spikes	of	this	current	by	the	use	of	electrodes	placed	on	the	exterior	of	the	skull	was	initially	met	with	indifference	if	not	scepticism	(Haas,	2003).19		However,	developed	by	others	notably	Edgar	Adrian,	it		seemed	to	enable	researchers	to	correlate	the	pathologies	of	living	subjects	with	patterns	of	activity	in	different	regions	of	the	brain	–	although	the	EEG	was	used	as	a	diagnostic	tool	and	made	no	claims	to	read	specific	mental	states	let	alone	thoughts		-	at	least	initially	(Adrian	and	Matthews,	1934;	Haas,	2003).	The	EEG	was	followed	by	a	range	of	other	analogous	methods	that	sought	to	reveal	the	activities	of	the	living	brain	in	real	time,	to	make	mental	activity	legible	by	placing	sensors	of	one	sort	or	another	on	the	exterior	of	the	skull.		The	most	recent	of	these	is	NIRS	–	near	infrared	spectroscopy	–	involves	the	subject	donning	a	kind	of	‘helmet’	with	multiple	sensors	that	use	infra-red	light	than	can	penetrate	the	intact	skull.		These	are	used	to	measure	changes	in	blood	oxygenation	in	
	the	brain	which	is	thought	to	correlate	with	brain	activation.		Although	the	main	uses	of	NIRS	were	initially	medical,	it	is	now	being	used	to	study	vision,	language	and	many	other	‘functional’	properties	of	the	brain	such	as	vision,	hearing,	and	the	performance	of	cognitive	tasks	(Villringer	and	Chance,	1997).		To	quote	the	title	of	a	review	of	this	technology,	NIRS	enables	one	to	go	‘Beyond	the	Visible’	by	imaging	the	human	brain	with	light	(Obrig	and	Villringer,	2003).		As	early	as	2006,	Scott	Bunce	and	his	colleagues	at	Drexel	University,	supported	by	funds	from	the	US	Defence	Advanced	Research	Projects	Agency	(DARPA)	Augmented	Cognition	Program,	the	Office	of	Naval	Research	(ONR)	and	Homeland	Security,	pointed	out	its	many	practical	advantages	over	other	methods	of	brain	imaging,	because	it	enabled	the	subjects	to	move	about,	and	to	carry	out	tasks	in	a	relatively	normal	environment.		More	relevant	for	present	purposes,	Bunce	suggested	that	because	of	these	advantages,	NIRS	had	significant	potential	in	the	detection	of	deception	and	other	investigations	that	needed	to	be	done	in	clinical	offices	or	environments	other	than	laboratories	(Bunce,	Izzetoglu	et	al.,	2006).20		I	will	return	to	these	neurotechnologies	of	lie	detection	later.	
The	idea	underpinning	NIRS	-	that	levels	of	blood	oxygenation	indicate	brain	activity	because	active	brain	regions	and	circuits	require	increased	oxygenation	–	was,	of	course,		the	basis	of	the	most	prominent	technology	claiming	to	measure	brain	activity,	functional	magnetic	resonance	imagine	or	fMRI.		Positron	Emission	Technology	(PET)	was	the	first	apparatus	that	seemed	to	do	for	the	brain	what	X-Rays	had	done	for	the	body	–	to	let	the	mind	walk	among	the	tissues	themselves	as	an	early	enthusiast	had	exclaimed	about	X-Rays	(Kevles,	1997:	2;	for	the	history	of	PET,	see	Nutt,	2002).		However	it	is	a	difficult	method	to	use	as	it	involves	the	preparation	and	injection	of	short-lived	radiolabelled	molecules	in	a	medical	cyclotron	close	to	the	site	of	the	imaging	lab.		The	uptake	of	those	labelled	molecules	in	different	brain	regions	is	measured	using	a	scanner	that	imaged	multiple	sections	through	the	brain	and	compiled	them	together	using	versions	of	the	algorithms	that	had	previously	been	developed	for	
	CT	(computerised	axial	tomography)	structural	imaging	of	tissues	(Dumit,	2003).21		But	despite	these	logistical	difficulties,	and	the	recognition	of	the	great	technical	achievements	that	were	entailed	in	PET,	a	more	fundamental	shift	was	less	interrogated.		The	invention	of	PET	enabled	visualization	to	slip	almost	imperceptibly	from	one	epistemology	and	ontology	to	another	–	it	seemed	almost	as	if	the	characteristics	of	the	gaze	were	unaltered	when	it	moved	from	imaging	brain	structure	to	imaging	brain	
function.			In	both	cases	what	was	rendered	visible	by	the	‘engines	of	visualization’	(Maynard,	2000)	were	simulations,	but	simulations	of	function	embodied	very	different	technical	and	neurobiological	assumptions	than	those	of	structure.		In	the	case	of	function,	those	neurobiological	premises	included	a	thesis	about	localization	–	that	it	was	both	possible	and	important	to	identify	specific	regions	or	loci	in	the	brain	that	‘subserved’	particular	mental	functions	or	states	–	and	a	thesis	about	measurement	–	that	these	loci	might	be	identified	by	measuring	the	amount	of	activity	within	them	when	an	individual	undertook	a	task,	by	means	of	a	proxy.22		These	two	assumptions,	along	with	many	others,	underpinned	the	development	and	interpretation	of	fMRI.		This	used	the	principle	of	magnetic	resonance	imaging,	a	superb	technical	achievement	involving	pioneering	work	of	many	inventors	and	researchers	–	to	image	a	proxy	measure	of	function	–	changes	in	blood	oxygenation	(Raichle,	2009).		It	did	not	require	any	direct	invasions	into	the	body	by	dyes	or	tracers,	but	worked	on	the	principle	that	oxygenated	blood	had	different	magnetic	properties	than	non-oxygenated	blood,	and	that	when	an	individual	placed	his	or	her	brain	in	a	scanner,	this	was	able	to	identify	those	regions	–	actually	those	voxels	in	a	three	dimensional	space	within	which	the	brain	was	situated	–	where	blood	oxygenation	changed	during	a	task	–	whether	that	be	identifying	a	pattern	on	a	screen	or	merely	simulating	a	mental	state.				
The	first	papers	using	this	technology	were	published	in	1980	–	thirty	years	later	they	were	running	at	around	10,000	per	year.23			Interpreting	the	results	from	the	use	of	this	BOLD	technique,24	as	it	was	called,	raised	a	multitude	of	technical,	epistemological	and	
	ontological	questions	(Logothetis,	2008).			Not	just	those	multitude	of	assumptions	‘black	boxed’	in	the	incredibly	sophisticated	computer	packages	that	turned	data	from	voxels	in	a	three	dimensional	space	into	simulated	images	that	had	a	compelling	realism.		Not	just	those	concerning	the	thesis	of	localisation:	‘blobology’	–	as	some	have	derisively		termed	it25	-	seems	to	ignore	the	complex	circuitry	of	the	human	brain	and	the	fact	that	any	mental	function	entails,	and	depends	upon,	activity	in	multiple	regions	and	circuits	of	the	human	brain	and	its	integral	connections	with	inputs	from	the	wider	nervous	system.26			Not	just	those	concerning	the	measurement	techniques,	which	involve	‘subtracting	out’	all	activity	in	the	‘resting	brain’	–	that	is	to	say	ignoring	anything	except	measurable	changes	in	blood	oxygenation	while	the	individual	in	the	scanner	carries	out	the	instructions	of	the	researcher	(Raichle	and	Snyder,	2007;	Callard	and	Margulies,	2011).		But	also	those	of	scale:		Logothetis	estimates	that a	typical	voxel	size		in	fMRI	“contains	5.5	million	neurons,	between	2.2	x	1010	and	5.5	x	1010	synapses,	22km	of	dendrites	and	220km	of	axons”		(Logothetis,	2008:	875)	leaving	to	one	side	all	the	other	complications	that	will	shape	the	blood	oxygen	level	variations	within	this	cube	of	brain	tissue,	notably	the	balance	in	every	single	neuron	between	excitation	and	inhibition.		But	it	is	not	only	that	this	technology	is	imaging	heterogeneous	neural	activity,	to	say	the	least,	it	is	also	because	we	actually	have	almost	no	idea	of	the	appropriate	scale	to	image	mental	function	–	at	the	cellular	level,	at	the	level	of	specific	circuits,	at	the	level	of	the	whole	brain,	at	the	level	of	the	whole	nervous	system….27		And,	of	course,	the	technology	itself,	inescapably	dependent	on	what	can	be	done	in	a	scanner,	imposes	very	severe	constraints	on	recognizing	that	in	everyday	life,	mental	activity	occurs	in	persons,	in	bodies,	spaces	and	interactions	that	we	have	come	to	call,	for	shorthand	–	social.			
But	nonetheless,	it	became	widely	accepted	that	here,	at	last,	was	a	technique	to	render	the	activities	of	the	working	mind	visible	in	the	living	brain.28			And	it	was	on	the	basis	of	that	claim	that	brain	imaging	in	general,	and	fMRI	in	particular,	moved	out	of	the	
	laboratory	in	which	it	was	born,	and	out	of	the	psychiatric	and	neurological	clinic	where	it	found	its	initial	habitat,	and	started	to	occupy	all	the	ecological	niches	that	psychology	had	already	colonised	–which	is	to	say,	all	those	places	where	human	conduct	seemed	to	be	shaped	by	the	activity	of	the	human	mind.		And	while	psychology’s	proxies	for	mind	reading	–	its	projective	tests,	its	scales,	its	interviews	and	inductions	from	laboratory	experiments	–	were	so	often	criticised	and	even	parodied	for	their	claims	to	really	know	what	their	subjects	were	thinking,	the	proxies	used	by	the	brain	imagers,	and	the	elaborate	statistical	and	other	transformations	entailed	in	rendering	those	compelling	simulations	–	those	pictures	of	mental	activity	in	the	brain	–	largely	slipped	unnoticed	into	the	background.		An	objective	and	materialist	technology	for	‘reading	the	mind’	now	seemed	to	be	possible.	
Deception:	what	is	a	lie?	
Perhaps	the	first	to	claim	to	be	able	to	identify	specific	thoughts	or	memories	in	the	brain	were	those	who	believed	they	could	identify	the	neural	signatures	of	deception	–	to	detect	the	liar	and	the	lie.29		Lawrence	Farwell’s	‘brain	fingerprinting’	technique		measures	a	particular	pattern	of	electrical	brain	activity	–	the	P300	wave	–	and	Farwell	argues	that	this	responds	differently	when	a	suspected	liar	is	exposed	to	images	or	words,	depending	on	their	prior	knowledge	–	for	example.	when	a	suspect	in	a	crime	is	shown	an	image	of	the	crime	scene	or	the	weapon,	the	patterns	of	brain	activity	will	differ	according	to	whether	that	information	is	‘stored’		in	their	brain.30		While	in	Farwell’s	technology,	as	in	the	search	for	the	engram,		the	brain	is	construed	as	a	kind	of	storage	device	for	memories,	two	other	commercial	companies	in	the	US	-	No	Lie	MRI		and	Cephos	Corporation		-	base	their	technologies	on	fMRI,	and	seek	the	neural	signature	of	the	way	in	which	–	in	their	view	-	the	brain	actively	manages	the	process	of	deception.		For	example,		No	Lie	MRI	Inc.	“provides	unbiased	methods	for	the	detection	of	deception	and	other	information	stored	in	the	brain….	The	technology	used	by	No	Lie	
	MRI	represents	the	first	and	only	direct	measure	of	truth	verification	and	lie	detection	in	human	history!...	No	Lie	MRI	uses	techniques	that:	Bypass	conscious	cognitive	processing….		Measure	the	activity	of	the	central	nervous	system	(brain	and	spinal	cord)	rather	than	the	peripheral	nervous	system	(as	polygraph	testing	does).”31			
These	claims	to	be	able	to	identify	specific	patterns	of	brain	activity	when	an	individual	is	lying	have	been	much	criticized	on	both	technical	and	legal	grounds	(Simpson,	2008;	Brown	and	Murphy,	2009;	Rissman,	Greely	et	al.,	2010;	Shen	and	Jones,	2011).32		Despite	the	endeavours	of	entrepreneurial	neuroscientists,	the	courts	and	legal	system	seem	able	to	recognise	the	multiple	problems	in	extrapolating	from	laboratory	based	studies	-	where	individuals	are	instructed	to	lie	or	tell	the	truth	-	to	real	life	situations	where	the	very	fact	of	being	accused	of	a	crime	generates	unknown	patterns	of	brain	activity,	and	where	those	who	are	genuinely	guilty	are	likely	to	employ	multiple	techniques	to	disguise	their	deception.			But,	as	with	the	polygraph,33		there	is	a	potential	market	for	these	devices	outside	the	agonistic	and	rule	governed	domain	of	the	courtroom,		in	industry,	in	the	military,	in	the	investigative	process	itself,	and	it	is	here	that	the	purveyors	of	neural	lie	detection	are	seeking	a	more	credulous	–	or	less	scrupulous	-	market	for	their	wares.				
It	appears	that	this	is	how	the	infamous	Brain	Electrical	Oscillations	Signature	(BEOS)	test	is	being	used	in	India.34			There	was	much	publicity	when	the	BEOS	test	-	a	‘guilty	knowledge’	test	developed	by	an	Indian	neuroscientist	Champadi	Raman	Mukundan	which	operates	on	the	same	principle	as	Farwell’s	P300	method	-	was	used	in	2008	to	convict	Aditi	Sharma	for	murder	–	giving	her	husband	sweets	laced	with	poison	-	on	the	basis	of	her	“neuro-experiential	knowledge”:	it	was	claimed	that	characteristic	brain	patterns	showing	such	knowledge	were	elicited	during	an	EEG	examination	when	she	heard	statements	concerning	the	act	of	poisoning.		It	was	not	her	words	that	were	used	to	convict	her	–	she	remained	silent	–	but	the	evidence	of	the	brain	itself.		There	was	
	rather	less	publicity	when	she	was	released	on	bail	pending	appeal,		after	the	National	Institute	of	Mental	Health	and	Neuro	Sciences	(NIMHANS)	declared	that	brain	scan	evidence	did	not	meet	appropriate	criteria	of	scientificity	and	could	not	be	used	in	court.		In	2010,	in	a	ruling	also	considering	the	admissibility	of	evidence	from	the	polygraph	and	from	narcolepsy,	the	Indian	Supreme	Court	ruled	–	largely	on	the	grounds	of	the	rights	not	to	self-incriminate	-	that	no	individual	can	be	forcibly	compelled	to	take	a	lie	detector	test,	whether	a	traditional	polygraph	or	a	neural	lie	detector	–	and	that	evidence	from	such	tests	was	inadmissible	in	Indian	courts.35		But	according	to	Angela	Saini,	the	BEOS	test	is	still	widely	used	in	India,	not	in	the	courtroom	but	in	the	investigative	process,	where	it	apparently	has	induced	numerous	suspects	to	make	confessions.	36		
No	Lie	MRI	now	also		imagines	its	potential	customers	outside	the	courtroom:		security	firms,	insurance	companies,	banks	and	financial	service	corporations,	concerned	about	deception	by	employees,	but	currently	forbidden	(in	the	US)	from	using	the	polygraph	on	their	employees.37		Similarly,	they	ask,	why	should	it	not	be	used	by	governments	concerned	about	corruption,	by	individuals	concerned	to	discover	if	their	partners	or	potential	dates	are	telling	the	truth	–	indeed	anywhere	where	deception	is	a	problem,	fraud	is	a	possibility,	or	confidence	is	to	be	maintained,	neural	lie	detection	can	play	its	part.		In	the	US	in	particular,	the	security	apparatus	provides	one	potentially	hospitable	ecological	niche.			Thus	Larry	Farwell		is	keen	to	suggest	the	crucial	role	of	brain	fingerprinting	in	identifying	potential	terrorists,	detecting	whether	they	have	a	memory	of	a	particular	training	camp,	code	word,	bomb	making	procedure	or	whatever.38			As	Melissa	Littlefield	has	shown,	much	of	the	original	impetus	for	funding	of	research	into	brain	based	lie	detection	came	from	the	CIA	and	related	agencies:		as	she	argues,	the	terrorist	attacks	on	the	US	in	September	2001	created	“a	niche	of	heightened	anxiety”	amenable	to	the	rhetoric	of	brain	based	lie	detection	(Littlefield,	2009:	383).			
	The	thesis	that	is	beginning	to	acquire	plausibility	is	that	while	deceitful	words	are	cheap	and	easy,	and	bodies	can	be	trained	to	deceive,	the	brain	cannot	lie.	39		But	from	the	lab	to	the	real	world	is	a	rather	longer	and	more	difficult	journey	than	the	inventors	suggest	–	for	in	the	real	world,	innocent	individuals	being	tested	are	awash	with	confusing	and	competing	affects,	the	potentially	guilty	are	alert	to	the	need	for	countermeasures,	and,	at	least	as	far	as	the	law	is	concerned,	each	defendant	must	to	be	judged	as	an	individual	rather	than	on	the	basis	of	probabilities	(although	this	last	proviso	does	not	apply	to	those	detained	at	borders	on	the	basis	of	algorithms	of	riskiness).40			And	what	is	a	lie	–	for	if	a	mistaken	belief,		genuinely	held,	is	a	lie,	who	among	us	is	not	a	liar.			We	should	not	be	surprised	to	find	an	emergent	neuroethical	discourse	on	the	nature	and	limits	of	neural	privacy	(Wolpe,	Foster	et	al.,	2005;	Langleben	and	Moriarty,	2013;	Farah,	Hutchinson	et	al.,	2014).			Yet	despite	the	aspirations	of	the	spooks,	the	rhetoric	of	the	entrepreneurs,	and	the	worries	of	the	ethicists,	we	remain		a	very	long	way	from	the	science	fiction	scenarios	of	brain	scanners	at	the	borders	to	screen	those	passing	through	for	lying	about	their	intentions	to	commit	terrorist	acts.41	
Intention	
Despite	the	abiding	interest	of	the	defence	and	military	establishment	especially	in	the	US		(Tennison	and	Moreno,	2012),	neural	lie	detection	remains,	in	the	main,		the	questionable	aspiration	of	enthusiastic	and	often	somewhat	marginal	entrepreneurs.		But	the	desire	to	read	the	contents	of	the	mind	in	the	brain	itself	remains	unquenched	in	the	heartland	of	neurobiological	research,	even	though	most	prefer	terms	such	as	‘brain	reading’	or	‘thought	identification’	to	demarcate	their	scientific	research	from	popular	mythology.			I	have	already	referred	to	the	media	reports	of	the	research	by	John-Dylan	Haynes	at	the	Max	Planck	Institute	for	Human	Cognitive	Brain	Sciences	in	Leipzig	which,	in	the	words	of	Ian	Sample,	the	respected	science	correspondent	of		the	Guardian	
	newspaper,	broke	“controversial	new	ground	in	scientist’s	ability	to	probe	people’s	minds	and	eavesdrop	on	their	thoughts,	and	raises	serious	ethical	issues	over	how	brain-reading	technology	may	be	used	in	the	future.”42			Using	the	scanner,	said	Professor	Haynes,	enables	us	to	look	around	the	brain	for	information	“It’s	like	shining	a	torch	around,	looking	for	writing	on	a	wall”.		Scary	indeed,	scary	enough	to	provoke	Professor	Haynes	to	speculate	about	the	implications	when	the	criminal	justice	system	uses	the	technique	to	identify	pre-criminals,	and	to	lead	various	neuroscientists	and	neuroethicists	to	reach	for	their	pens	to	express	their	anxieties	about	the	potential	implications.			
Of	course,	we	should	not	be	surprised	to	find	that	the	experiment	was	rather	less	dramatic	than	this	report	suggests.		Eight	volunteers	who	met	certain	criteria	(handedness,	vision)		were	asked	by	the	researchers	in	a	laboratory	to	decide	whether	they	would	add	or	subtract	two	numbers	that	they	would	later	be	shown	on	a	screen	(Haynes,	Sakai	et	al.,	2007).	Both	before	they	were	shown	the	numbers,	and	during	their	completion	of	the	task,	they	were	scanned	with	fMRI,	which	focussed	on	activity	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex.		There	was	a	time	delay	of	between	2.7	and	10.8	seconds	between	the	time	when	they	were	instructed	to	form	their	intention	and	the	time	when	they	were	presented	with	the	material	to	carry	out	the	task;	in	around	two	thirds	of	the	cases,	the	researchers		were	able	to	predict	from	the	brain	signature	in	the	scan	whether	the	individual	would	add	or	subtract	the	numbers.		Hence,	the	paper	concluded,	it	was	possible	to	‘decode	intentions’	from	patterns	of	activity	in	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex.		While	this	particular	paper	gained	the	publicity,	it	drew	on	a	longer	trajectory	of	previous	research;	Haynes,	working	with	others	including	Geraint	Rees,43	had	published	a	number	of	papers	suggesting	that	it	was	possible	to	decode	mental	states	from	brain	activity	in	humans,	and	that	this	in	principle	would	make	‘brain	reading’	possible	(Haynes	and	Rees,	2006;	Haynes,	Sakai	et	al.,	2007).			And	in	a	series	of	subsequent	experiments	on	‘volition’,	Haynes		-	who	was	to	become	Director	of	Berlin	Center	for	
	Advanced	Neuroimaging	(BCAN)	-	and	others	have	attempted	to	study	the	non-conscious	neural	determinants	of	free	decisions,		arguing	that	fMRI	studies	can	identify	distinct	patterns	of	activity	in	the	brain	during	the	period	of	anticipation,		before	an	individual	is	aware	of	having	made	a	decision	(Kahnt,	Heinzle	et	al.,	2010;	Tusche,	Bode	et	al.,	2010;	Haynes,	2011;	Haynes,	2015).44		When	Haynes	gave	a	talk	at	the	World	Science	Festival	in	2009,	it	was	tagged	“It	sounds	like	you	are	talking	about	mind-reading”.45					
In	a	related	line	of	research,	a	number	of	investigators	have	suggested	that	‘though	identification’	in	the	human	brain	is	possible	because	the	brain	develops	specialised	neurons	to	react	to	specific	images.			Thus,	for	instance,	Christoph	Koch,	Itzhak	Fried	and	their	colleagues	have	argued	that	specific	neurons	encode	very	particular	memories:	
		“We	have	previously	shown	that	neurons	in	the	human	medial	temporal	lobe	(MTL)	fire	selectively	to	images	of	faces,	animals,	objects	or	scenes	…	Here	we	report	on	a	remarkable	subset	of	[medial	temporal	lobe]	neurons	that	are	selectively	activated	by	strikingly	different	pictures	of	given	individuals,	landmarks	or	objects	and	in	some	cases	even	by	letter	strings	with	their	names.	These	results	suggest	an	invariant,	sparse	and	explicit	code,	which	might	be	important	in	the	transformation	of	complex	visual	percepts	into	long-term	and	more	abstract	memories.”	(Quiroga,	Reddy	et	al.,	2005:	1102).			
Most	strikingly,	for	the	researchers,	was	a	neuron	that	selectively	fired	when	the	individual	was	exposed	to	a	picture	of	an	actress.			Making	use	of	intracranial	electrodes	implanted	in	the	brains	of	eight	patients	undergoing	surgery	for	epilepsy,	they	found	that	a	single	neuron	in	the	right	anterior	hippocampus	was	activated	by	pictures	of	Halle	Berry,	drawings	of	Halle	Berry,	images	of	Halle	Berry	dressed	as	Catwoman	and	by	the	letter	string	‘Halle	Berry’.		In	another	subject,	a	single	neuron	in	the	left	posterior	hippocampus	was	activated	exclusively	by	different	views	of	the	actress	Jenifer	Aniston	
	which	perhaps	explains	why	The	National	Geographical	Magazine’s	feature	article	on	‘Secrets	of	the	Brain’	in	its	April	2014	issue	was	prefaced	by	a	photomontage	of	dozens	of	pictures	of	Jennifer	Aniston.46	
Other	researchers	also	argued	that	it	was	possible	to	use	brain	scanning	technology	to	identify	specific	thoughts	–	in	this	case,	not	by	activating	a	neuron	that	encoded	a	specific	visual	memory,		but	by	mapping	the	neurons	that	fire	during	a	current	thought	of	a	particular	object.	In	2004,	Tom	Mitchell	and	Marcel	Just	and	their	colleagues	at	Carnegie	Mellon	University	published	a	paper	in	which	machine	learning	techniques	were	used	on	fMRI	images,	not	averaging	them	over	a	period,	as	is	normal,	but	seeking	to	detect	a	“transient	cognitive	state”	by	“automatically	decod[ing]	the	subject’s	cognitive	state	at	a	single	time	instant	or	interval.”	This	paper	focussed	on	vision,	and	detailed	three	“case	studies		in	which	we	have	successfully	trained	classifiers	to	distinguish	cognitive	states	such	as	(1)	whether	the	human	subject	is	looking	at	a	picture	or	a	sentence,	(2)	whether	the	subject	is	reading	an	ambiguous	or	non-ambiguous	sentence,	and	(3)	whether	the	word	the	subject	is	viewing	is	a	word	describing	food,	people,	buildings,	etc.”	(Mitchell,	Hutchinson	et	al.,	2004:	145).			In	2009,	their	work	moved	beyond	vision	to	focus	on	what		they	came	to	call	“thought	identification;”		this	work	was	featured	in	a	CBS	documentary	fronted	by	Leslie	Stahl	entitled	“Tech	that	reads	your	mind”	which	claimed	that	the	goal	of	Just	and	Mitchell	was	to	see	if	they	could	identify	exactly	what	happens	in	the	brain	when	people	think	specific	thoughts:	
	They	did	an	experiment	where	they	asked	subjects	to	think	about	10	objects--5	of	them	tools	like	screwdriver	and	hammer,	and	5	of	them	dwellings,	like	igloo	and	castle.	They	then	recorded	and	analyzed	the	activity	in	the	subjects'	brains	for	each.			"The	computer	found	the	place	in	the	brain	where	that	person	was	thinking	'screwdriver’?	[Stahl	asked]			“Screwdriver	isn't	one	place	in	the	brain.	It's	many	places	in	the	brain.	When	you	think	of	a	screwdriver,	you	think	about	how	you	hold	
	it,	how	you	twist	it,	what	it	looks	like,	what	you	use	it	for,"	Just	explained….When	we	think	"screwdriver"	or	"igloo"	for	example,	Just	says	neurons	start	firing	at	varying	levels	of	intensity	in	different	areas	throughout	the	brain.	"And	we	found	that	we	could	identify	which	object	they	were	thinking	about	from	their	brain	activation	patterns,"	he	said.	"We're	identifying	the	thought	that's	occurring.	It's...incredible,	just	incredible,"	he	added.”47				
The	neuroethicists	were	on	hand	to	speculate	about	the	implications	for	the	US	criminal	justice	system	–	for	example,	given	that	no	one	can	be	forced	to	testify	against	themselves,	would	brain	images	fall	foul	of	the	Fifth	Amendment?		And	apparently	“Back	at	Carnegie	Mellon,	Just	and	Mitchell	have	already	uncovered	the	signatures	in	our	brains	for	kindness,	hypocrisy,	and	love.”48		In	the	same	programme,	John-Dylan	Haynes	commented	on	the	capacity	of	brain	imaging	to	see	if	an	individual	recognized	an	image	of	a	face	or	place	that	they	had	seen	before	–	maybe	an	Al	Qaeda	training	camp	–	he	had	not	been	contacted	by	the	US	security	agencies,	he	said,	but	he	had	been	contacted	by	the	Germans.			
In	another	much	publicized	experiment,	the	team	of	Shinji	Nishimoto	and	Jack	Gallant	at	Berkeley	claimed	to	be	able	to	reconstruct	movies	using	only	the	results	from	brain	imaging	using	a	modified	version	of	the	BOLD	response	(Nishimoto,	Vu	et	al.,	2011).		The	website	Unwitting	Victim,	which	shows	some	of	the	reconstructed	images,			drew	parallels	between	this	research	and	the	storyline	of	movies	such	as	Brainstorm	and	The	Cell,		where	researchers	were	able	to	access	experiences,	dreams	and	memories	–	and	points	out	that	“In	Harry	Potter	…		memories	and	thoughts	were	treated	as	tangible	objects	that	can	be	extracted	from	the	mind	and	viewed	by	others	or	even	stored	for	future	perusal.”49		Despite	the	publicity	that	I	referred	to	at	the	start	of	this	paper	–	“I	build	a	brain	decoder”	-	the	more	widespread	use	of	this	technology	to	extract	such	details	from	the	brain	itself	may	be	some	way	off	–	the	procedure	used	by	Nishimoto	and	
	Gallant	required	volunteers	to	remain	still	in	a	bran	scanner	for	many	hours	at	a	time.50		But	the	point	remains:	technology	here	appears	to	have	demonstrated	that	not	just	thoughts,	memories	and	intentions,	but	also	the	images	that	populate	our	internal	world	–	are	not	fleeting	and	transient	impressions	in	an	ephemeral	mental	domain,	but	are	materially	embedded	in	the	brain	itself.			
Can	they	read	your	mind?	
“Mind-boggling!	Science	creates	computer	that	can	decode	your	thoughts	and	put	them	into	words”	screamed	a	headline	in	the	Daily	Mail	on	the	first	of	February	2012:	“Scientists	believe	they	have	found	a	way	to	read	our	minds,	using	a	computer	program	that	can	decode	brain	activity	in	our	brains	and	put	it	into	words.”51		But	the	website	of	the	UK’s	NHS	Choices	took	a	more	sanguine	view.52 	With	the	strapline	“Mind	reading	remains	in	the	realm	of	fantasy”	it	gave	a	clear	account	of	the	work	of		scientists	in	Robert	Knight’s	lab	at	Berkeley	who	took	advantage	of	the	opening	of	the	skull	for	some	15	subjects	undergoing	brain	surgery	to	attach	electrodes	to	the	lateral	temporal	cortex	(Pasley,	David	et	al.,	2012).	The	researchers	used	the	signals	from	that	area	to	try	to	reconstruct	words	that	the	subjects	heard.	Although	the	findings	showed	that	the	reconstructions	were	of	very	poor	quality,	and	recognizable	only	by	computer	models	and	not	by	human	listeners,	the	research	was	reported	by	the	normally	sober	Daily	Telegraph	as	“Mind-reading	Device	Could	Become	Reality”.		Much	of	the	excitement	of	the	newspapers	rested	not	on	the	capacities	of	such	technologies	to	invade	neural	privacy,	however,	but	on	their	role	in	the	more	traditional	niche	of	the	clinic:	the	hope	that	they	may	allow	the	‘reading’	of	the	minds	of	those	with	‘locked	in	syndrome’,	or	for	those	with	spinal	cord	injuries	to	control	computers	or	machinery	with	their	thoughts.53			
Work	on	‘neural	prostheses’	has	already	begun	to	show	these	possibilities.		A	series	of	papers	from	Andrew	Schwartz	and	his	colleagues	have	charted	their	development	of		brain-controlled	interfaces	“devices	that	capture	brain	transmissions	involved	in	a	
	subject's	intention	to	act,	with	the	potential	to	restore	communication	and	movement	to	those	who	are	immobilized.”	(Schwartz,	Cui	et	al.,	2006:	205).		Using	a	cerebral	implant	that		records	action	potentials	from	populations	of	individual	neurons	in	motor	cortical	areas,	initially	with	monkeys,	and	most	recently	with	humans,	signals	are	transmitted	that	enable	the	subject	to	move	a	prosthetic	limb	with	thought	alone.			In	2012,	they	reported	in	The	Lancet	the	success	of	an	operation	to	use	a	neural	implant	for	Jan	Scheuermann,	52-year-old	woman	with	longstanding	quadriplegia,	who	was	able	to	manoeuvre	a	mind-controlled,	human-like	robot	arm	in	seven	dimensions	to		perform	complex	motions	of	everyday	life	–	she	was	able	to	move	the	arm,	turn	the	wrist,	close	the	hand	for	the	first	time	in	nine	years	–	although,	of	course,	it	was	not	part	of	her	physical	body(Collinger,	Wodlinger	et	al.,	2013).54				
In	related,	somewhat	controversial	research	undertaken	by	Miguel	Nicolelis	at	his	lab	at	Duke	University	Medical	School	–	and	in	the	International	Institute	of	Neuroscience	of	Natal	which	he	founded	North-eastern	Brazil	–	monkeys	with	multi-electrode	cortical	implants	connected	wirelessly	to	robots	or	computer-generated	images	have	learned	to	control	the	movements	of	these	robots	or	avatars,	sometimes	situated	in	far	distant	labs,	by	their	brain	activity	alone	(Nicolelis	and	Chapin,	2002),	and	rats	with	their	brains	‘wired	together’	have	been	able	to	transmit	“behaviorally	meaningful	sensorimotor	information”	from	brain	to	brain	(Pais-Vieira,	Lebedev	et	al.,	2013).55			In	fact,	Nicolelis	is	harshly	critical	of	the	reductionism	and	localisation-ism	of	many	of	the	brain	researchers	whose	work	I	have	discussed	in	this	paper,	arguing	against	those	who	believe	that	they	can	reconstruct	brain	processes	from	a	focus	on	the	properties	of	individual	neurons,	that	the	belief	that	brain	functions	are	localised	is	fundamentally	misleading,	and	that	memories,	thoughts	and	representations	of	the	world	do	not	inhere	in	single	neurons,	as	in	the	Halle	Berry	example,	but	are	created	by	populations	of	neurons	constantly	in	flux,	constantly	creating	and	recreating	internal	neuronal	models	of	the	world	(Nicolelis,	2011).		Nonetheless,	in	the	words	of	the	titles	of	some	of	his	
	papers,	Nicolelis	is	‘reconstructing	the	engram’	and	‘seeking	the	neural	code’(Nicolelis,	Ghazanfar	et	al.,	1997;	Nicolelis	and	Ribeiro,	2006).		Readers	will	not	be	surprised	to	learn	that	the	research	of	both	Schwarz	and	Nicolelis	was	part	funded	by	the	Defence	Advanced	Research	Projects	Agency,56	which	recently	announced	its		ElectRX	program,	a	$78.9	million	project,	part	of	President	Obama’s	BRAIN	initiative,	to	develop	a	cerebral	implant	that	can	track	and	respond	to	brain	signals	in	real	time	with	the	aim	of	both	reading,	and	modulating,	neural	activity.57			For		while	both	body	and	brain	may	rendered		‘readable’,		in	the	materialist	ontology	of	the	person	that	is	taking	shape,	the	brain	has	the	advantage	over	the	body	in	being	both	a	potentially	legible	surface	of	thoughts	and	intentions,	and	the	potentially	modulatable	locus	of	those	thoughts	and	intentions.		In	that	respect,	at	least	for	those	whose	objective	is	control		-	whether	that	be	for	security	or	therapy	-	legibility	in	itself	is	only	a	first	step:	reading	out	the	messages	from	the	brain	leads	to	the	hope	that	one	might	read	back	messages	into	the	brain	to	modulate	those	thoughts	and	intentions	themselves.	
Conclusions	
So	will	‘they’	soon	be	able	to	read	our	minds?	Are	we	sleepwalking	into	a	Minority	Report	society?	Must	we	defend	neural	privacy,	and	worry	about	our	security	agencies	not	merely	reading	our	texts	and	emails,	but	accessing	our	thoughts	themselves,	seeing	the	neural	traces	of	every	little	lie,	every	perverse	desire,	every	evil	or	antisocial	intention?		It	is	certainly	premature	to	conclude	that	these	neurotechnologies	have	rendered	the	mind	transparent	through	their	access	to	traces	in	the	brain;	these	endeavours	are	currently	largely	confined	to	the	enclosed	and	artificial	sites	of	the	laboratory.		It	is	too	early	to	tell	whether	the	efforts	of	the	enthusiasts	and	entrepreneurs,		in	alliance	with	the	hopes	of	our	military	and	law	enforcement	agencies,	will	succeed	in	taking	these	technologies	out	of	the	lab	into	practices	for	the	surveillance	of	dangerous	individuals,	let	alone	in	using	brain	modulation	directly	for	the	
	government	of	conduct.	58		Both	utopian	and	dystopian	speculations	are		based	on	extrapolations	from	limited	experiments	in	very	artificial	situations	which	bear	little	relevance	to	how	beliefs,	intentions,	desires	and	the	like	are	manifested,	experienced,	communicated	and	regulated	in	the	everyday	world.			Claims	about	mind	reading	in	the	popular	media	undoubtedly	entail	familiar	mishmashes	of	technology,	software,	epistemology,	ontology,	expectations,	ethics	and	politics.			And	when	the	speculations	of	neuroethicists,	the	exaggerations	of	neuroscientists,	the	imaginations	of	science	fiction,	and	the	aspirations	of	our	military	researchers	coincide,	a	heady	mix	of	unreality	usually	results.			Practical	applications	of	these	brain	reading	technologies	are	most	likely	merely	to	add	to	the	multiple	other	low	tech	–	and	perhaps	less	fascinating	-	tools	that	are	already	used	for	these	purposes	for	children,	asylum	seekers,	job	seekers,	benefit	seekers	and	many	others.				Perhaps	the	most	interesting	questions	are	less	technical	than	political	-		not	‘can	we	read	the	mind’,	but	why,	in	particular	practices,	do	some	want	to	read	some	minds,	and	why	do	some	dream	that	new	neurotechnologies	will	make	this	possible.59			
Nonetheless,	despite	all	our	doubts	and	our	necessary	scepticism	we	may	be	seeing	signs	here	that	a	new	ontology	is	gradually	emerging	out	of	the	shadows.		Even	if	they	remain	confined	to	laboratory	conditions,	there	is	a	challenging	materialism	embodied	and	enacted	in	the		capacity	of	novel	neurotechnologies	to	access	the	contents	of	the	human	mind,	whether	these	be	to	evaluate	the	presence	of	particular	mental	states	or	capacities,	the	existence	of	durable	memory	traces,	or	even	the	fleeting	existence	of	specific	thoughts	and	intentions.			Must	we	suppose	a	mental	realm	that	is	different	in	substance	or	extension	from	the	brain?	While	Wittgensteinian	philosophers	object	that	such	neuroscience	attributes	to	brains	things	that	can	only	properly	be	attributed	to	persons	(Bennett	and	Hacker,	2003),	can	we	consider	the	possibility	that	these	neural	processes	do	not	merely	‘subserve’	mental	states	but	are,	instead,	the	real	material	locus	
	of	such	mental	states,	feelings	and	intentions?		Could	it	be	that	it	is	indeed	the	brain	that	thinks,	feels	and	intends?	
Perhaps	this	is	what	Gilles	Deleuze	was	hinting	at	in	that	enigmatic	phrase	“the	brain	is	the	screen”	which	I	used	as	the	epigraph	to	this	paper.				One	might	argue	that	the	most	durable	philosophies	of	the	human	have	always	had	a	very	close	relation	to	contemporary	medical	and	scientific	practices.60		Speaking	of	the	relationship	between	philosophy	and	cinema	in	an	interview	published	in	1998,	Deleuze	says	
	“One	goes	quite	naturally	from	philosophy	to	cinema,	but	also	from	cinema	to	philosophy.	Their	unity	is	the	brain.	The	brain	is	the	screen.	I	don't	believe	linguistics	or	psychoanalysis	are	of	great	help	for	the	cinema.	On	the	other	hand,	there	is	the	biology	of	the	brain,	molecular	biology.		Thought	is	molecular,	there	are	molecular	speeds	which	make	up		the	slow	beings	that	we	are.	Michaux'	s	saying:	‘Man	is	a	slow	being,	who	is	only	made	possible	by	fantastic	speeds.’	The	circuits	and	links	of	the	brain	do	not	pre-exist	the	stimuli,	granules	or	corpuscles	which	trace	them”		(Deleuze	and	McMuhan,	1998:	48-49).			
And	elsewhere,	referring	directly	to	the	claim	“Man	thinks,	not	the	brain”,	Deleuze	argues	the	reverse:	“It	is	the	brain	that	thinks	and	not	man	–	the	latter	being	only	a	cerebral	crystallization.		We	will	speak	of	the	brain	as	Cézanne	spoke	of	the	landscape:	man	absent	from,	but	completely	within	the	brain”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari,	1994:	210).61	Despite	the	mundane	interests	of	those	who	fund	much	of	the	work	I	have	discussed	in	this	paper,	despite	the	overclaiming	endemic	in	the	popular	media,	and	despite	the	potent	mixture	of	potentially	hopeful	clinical	applications	and	potentially	undesirable	socio-political	deployments	within	these	findings,	something	more	profound	may	be	happening	in	these	endeavours	to	read	thoughts	in	the	molecular	biology	of	the	brain.			And	if	we	are	witnessing	the	glimmering	of	a	mutation	in	ontology,		it	will	undoubtedly	
	have	implications	for	our	philosophies	and	for	our	ethics,	for	the	ways	we	are	governed	by	others	and	for	the	ways	we	understand	and	govern	ourselves.		
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NOTES	
Except	where	otherwise	stated	in	the	notes,	all	web	links	were	last	accessed,	and	active,		on	1.09.2015	 	
																																								 																					1		 Deleuze’s	phrase	“the	brain	is	the	screen”	is	discussed	helpfully	in	an	interview	with	Melissa	McMuhan	published	in	1998	(Deleuze	and	McMuhan,	1998).		I	return	to	this	phrase	in	the	conclusion.	
2		 In	this	paper	I	will	not	address	the	large	and	growing	literature	in	the	social	sciences	about	brain	imaging,	in	areas	such	as	neuroeconomics,	neuromarketing	and	so	forth,	some	of	which	is	explored	in	N.	Rose	and	J.	Abi-Rached,	Neuro:	The	New	Brain	Sciences	
and	the	Management	of	the	Mind,	Princeton	University	Press,	2013.			Here	I	focus	on	the	use	of	neurotechnologies	with	the	aim	of	identifying	thoughts,	beliefs	and	intentions	directly	in	the	brain,	the	link	between	these	technologies	and	actual	or	potential	strategies	of	surveillance	and	control,	and	the	potential	emergence	of	a	‘materialist’	ontology.	
3			The	2002	film,	Minority	Report	is	often	used	by	those	who	worry	about	the	spread	of	surveillance	technologies.	In	the	film,	three	youth	with	special	precognitive	abilities	are	kept	sedated	and	linked	to	a	computer	that	reads	their	neural	patterns.	Law	enforcement	agents	use	the	projections	of	this	cyborg	assemblage	to	foresee	criminal	acts	before	they	occur,	and	to	arrest	and	charge	individuals	with	so-called	‘precrimes’.		The	phrase	“sleepwalking	into	a	Minority	Report	society”	was	used	by	some	of	the	commentator	when	the	research	of	John-Dylan	Haynes,	discussed	below,	was	reported	in	the	popular	media.	
4		 The	PowerPoint	slides	from	a	2007	presentation	of	FAST	by	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security	can	be	accessed	at	https://publicintelligence.net/dhs-future-
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														attribute-screening-technology-mobile-module-fast-m2-overview/			They	helpfully	show	the	imagined	set-up	in	which	an	individual	walks	through	an	enclosure	equipped	with	sensors	that	remotely	read	a	range	of	physiological	indicators		and	calibrate	them	against	norms,	so	that	law	enforcement	personnel	can	apprehend	those	who	register	high	on	markers	of	malintent.			Initially	named	‘Project	Hostile	Intent	(http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_phi.pdf	),	the	official	description	of	the	project,	dating	from	2008,		can	be	found	here:	http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf	.		It	has	been	subject	to	various	investigations	concerning	‘privacy	risks’	and	Freedom	of	Information	requests	by	the	US	Electronic	Privacy	Information	Center:	https://epic.org/foia/dhs/fast/		
5		 http://www.theguardian.com/science/2007/feb/09/neuroscience.ethicsofscience		
6		 http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140717-i-can-read-your-mind		
7		 For	a	relentless	rehearsal	of	the	position	that	contemporary	neuroscience	attributes	to	brains	things	that	can	only	properly	be	attributed	to	persons,	see	the	work	of	Bennett	and	Hacker	(Bennett	and	Hacker,	2003).		I	shall	return	to	this	question	at	the	end	of	the	paper.		
8		 The	initial	hypothesis	about	‘theory	of	mind’	in	primates	was	put	forward	by	Premack	and	Woodruff	(Premack	and	Woodruff,	1978).		Evolutionary	psychologists	such	as	Nicholas	Humphreys	speculated	that	the	large	brain	size	of	humans	and	some	other	primates	was	related	to	the	computational	capacities	necessary	for	social	relations	in	large	groups,	and	argument	later	developed	by	Robin	Dunbar	(Humphrey,	1976;	Dunbar,	1993;	Dunbar,	1998).	Leslie	Brothers	coined	the	phrase	‘social	brain’	in	her	classic	paper	of		1990,	which	made	the	argument	that	there	were	specific	brain	regions	for	‘social	cognition’	in	humans	and	some	other	primates	(Brothers,	1990).		These	and	other	arguments	laid	the	basis	of	what	John	Cacioppo	christened	‘social	neuroscience’	(for	a	useful	history,	see	Cacioppo,	Berntson	et	al.,	2011).		Later,	and	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														contested,	arguments	concerning	‘mirror	neurons’	suggested	that	what	was	at	stake	was	not	a	‘theory’	of	mind,	but	rather	that	when	one	individual	observes	the	actions	or	emotional	expressions	of	another,	a	small	number	of	neurons	are	activated	in	the	brain	of	the	watcher	in	the	very	circuits	that	are	activated	in	the	individual	who	is	observed	(Gallese	and	Goldman,	1998;	Rizzolatti	and	Craighero,	2004;	Iacoboni,	Molnar-Szakacs	et	al.,	2005).		Enthusiasts	for	mirror	neurons	argued	that	this	capacity	for	imitation	was	fundamental	to	the	evolution	of	human	societies	(Ramachandran,	1995)	though	others	doubted	their	very	existence	(Borg,	2007;	Hickok,	2009;	Lingnau,	Gesierich	et	al.,	2009).		Some	researchers	have	claimed	to	resolve	this	dispute	by	direct	recording	of	excitation	from	single	cells	in	human	medial	frontal	and	temporal	cortices	while	patients	executed	or	observed	hand	grasping	actions	and	facial	emotional	expressions	(Mukamel,	Ekstrom	et	al.,	2010:	750).	With	or	without	mirror	neurons,	the	existence	of	brain	regions	specialised	for	social	cognition	is	now	widely	accepted,	as	is	the	belief	that	this	‘social	brain’	circuitry	can	be	located	in	certain	brain	regions	or	pathways	(Adolphs,	2007;	Frith,	2007;	Frith,	2007).		
9		 Most	famously	in	the	thesis	that	children	diagnosed	with	autism	lack	‘theory	of	mind’	(Baron-Cohen,	Leslie	et	al.,	1985;	Ramachandran	and	Oberman,	2006).		The	‘mind-blindness’	thesis	(Baron-Cohen,	1997)	remains	controversial,	and	Baron-Cohen	himself	has	sought	to	supplement	it	with	additional,	and	even	more	controversial,	theses	on	the	role	of	emotions,	sex	differences	and	hormones.			
10		There	is	a	growing	research	programme	based	on	the	hypothesis	that	‘psychopathy’	–	a	highly	contested	category	in	itself	–	is	characterised	by	deficits	in	social	cognition,	such	that	psychopaths	lack	empathy,	and	do	not	‘feel	the	pain’	of	others	(Decety,	Skelly	et	al.,	2013;	Decety,	Skelly	et	al.,	2014),		From	the	turn	of	the	century,	psychopathy	rapidly	became	the	topic	of	dozens	of	research	studies	using	fMRI	(Moll,	de	Oliveira-Souza	et	al.,	2002;	Adolphs,	2003;	Raine,	Lencz	et	al.,	2003;	Raine,	Ishikawa	et	al.,	2004;	Moll,	Zahn	et	al.,	2005;	Yang,	Raine	et	al.,	2005;	Blair,	2007;	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														Weber,	Habel	et	al.,	2008;	Gregory,	Simmons	et	al.,	2012).			An	intensive	and	well	funded	research	programme	is	under	way	to	find	the	neural	signatures	that	would	predict	adult	psychopathy		-	the	neural	signatures	of	that	inability	to	feel	empathy	that	led	to	callous	and	unemotional	behaviour	in	children,	and	worse	in	adults	(Viding,	Blair	et	al.,	2005;	Hodgins,	Viding	et	al.,	2008;	Viding,	Jones	et	al.,	2008;	Viding,	Jones	et	al.,	2008;	Viding,	Hanscombe	et	al.,	2010;	Carré,	Hyde	et	al.,	2013).		The	aim	is	to	identify	those	lacking	the	evolved	capacity	for	normal	moral	reason	
before	their	violent	or	criminal	behaviour	becomes	apparent,	is	preventive	intervention,	which	most	often	takes	the	form	of	training	those	individuals	and	their	parents	in	ways	of	managing	and	channelling	their	wayward	impulses	in	acceptable	directions	for	the	good	of	each	and	the	good	of	all.	
11		Although,	as	both	Joelle	Abi-Rached	and	Des	Fitzgerald	pointed	out	to	me,	the	algorithms	used	for	data	mining,	whether	by	Amazon,	Google	or	by	the	US	National	Security	Agency,	do	already	to	something	like	this,	although	not	by	accessing	your	thoughts	themselves,	only	via	the	traces	of	your	desires	that	you	leave	on	the	web.	
12	I	cite	some	examples	later	in	this	paper,	but	the	description	this	work	as	‘mind-reading’	is	not	confined	to	the	popular	media,	see,	for	example,	the	reports	by	Kerri	Smith	in	Nature	(Smith,	2008;	Smith,	2013).	
13		One	could	refer	to	these	as	‘ecological	niches’,	in	the	way	the	term	is	used	by	Ian	Hacking,	in	his	book	Mad	Travellers	(Hacking,	1998)	to	describe	the	ways	in	which	certain	accounts	of	human	pathology	can	first	find,	and	then	lose,	their	conditions	for	flourishing.		
14		This	is	an	argument	made	most	powerfully	by	Francisco	Varela	(Varela,	Thompson	et	al.,	1993)	
15		Arguments	about	‘the	extended	mind’,	most	compellingly	made	by	Andy	Clark	and	David	Chalmers,	are	well	known	(Clark	and	Chalmers,	1998;	Clark,	2008).		Many	of	these	points	were	also	made	in	an	uncharacteristically	humanist	intervention	by	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														Georges	Canguilhem	entitled	‘The	Brain	and	Thought’	,	given	as	a	lecture	at	the	Sorbonne	organized	by	the	Mouvement	universel	pour	la	responsabilité	scientifique	(MURS)	in	December	1980,	and	first	published	in	the	journal	Prospective	et	Santé	14,	Summer	1980,	pp.	81–98	and	republished	as	the	foreword	to	the	proceedings	of	a	conference	(Actes	du	colloque	6–8	December	1990),	Georges	Canguilhem:	Philosophe,	
historien	des	sciences,	(Canguilhem,	1993:	11-33).			It	is	now	in	English	translation	(Canguilhem,	2008).	
16		This,	of	course,	was	the	method	used	by	the	famous	explorers	of	brain	function	in	the	nineteenth	century	in	their	practices	of	localization	–	Broca,	Wernicke,	Fleschig	and	many	more.		And	there	were	some	twentieth	century	exceptions,	notably	the	work	of	Wilder	Penfield,	whose	reactivation	of	memories	-	referred	to	earlier	in	this	paper	-	occurred	while	he	‘mapped’	the	cortex	by	stimulating	areas	that	had	been	exposed	during	surgery	to	ablate	the	foci	of	severe	and	intractable	epilepsy.		
17		Of	course,	this	work	also	led	to	the	search	for	the	brain	bases	of	mental	capacities,	arguments	about	differences	in	brain	size	between	men	and	women,	and	the	brain	bases	of	a	hierarchy	of	the	races.		The	enthusiasm	for	such	crainiology	was	short	lived,	not	least	because	the	brain	data	often	failed	to	correlate	with	popular	beliefs	about	the	links	between	social	worth	and	brain	size.		Once	more,	details	and	further	references	are	given	in	Rose	and	Abi-Rached,	2013.	
18		Egas	Moniz,	of	course,	went	on	to	develop	the	procedure	known	as	lobotomy	or	leucotomy;	he	and	others	used	it	to	intervene	in	the	living	brains	of	many	afflicted	individuals	in	the	tragic	endeavour	to	ameliorate	the	symptoms	of	mental	disorder.	
19		While	some	suggest	that	his	work	on	the	EEG	was	terminated	and	he	was	retired	because	of	opposition	to	the	Nazis:	more	recently,	historians	have	suggested		that	he	was,	in	fact,	a	member	of	the	SS,	and	participated	in	the	“Court	for	Genetic	Health”	that	ordered	sterilizations:	the	Wikipedia	entry	is	actually	a	good	guide	to	this	dispute:	http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans_Berger	,	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														20		“In	comparison	to	fMRI,	with	fNIRs	participants	can	sit	upright	and	work	on	a	computer	…	watch	television	or	movies,	and	even	walk	on	a	treadmill…	These	attributes	also	allow	fNIRs	to	be	used	with	children	and	with	patient	populations	that	may	find	confinement	to	an	fMRI	magnet	overwhelming	or	painful.	A	number	of	sensor	applications	exist,	depending	on	their	use,	including	caps,	tension	straps,	and	medical-grade	adhesive	applications.	fNIR	is	quiet	and	comfortable	and	is	therefore	amenable	to	sensitive	protocols	such	as	the	induction	of	positive	moods…	Portable	systems	exist	that	operate	from	a	laptop	computer	and	a	control	box	approximately	2	in	×	6	in	×	8	in.	Finally,	fNIRs	is	relatively	inexpensive,	with	available	systems	ranging	between	US$25,000–$300,000”	(Bunce,	Izzetoglu	et	al.,	2006:	57).	
21		To	stress	the	obvious,	computerized	tomography	images	structure,	that	is	to	say	tissues,	while	PET	claims	to	image	function,	by	means	of	a	process	where	changes	in	the	‘activity’	of	certain	tissues	is	indicated	by	their	active	take	up	of	molecules	labeled	with	radioactive	tracer.		
22		Many	contemporary	neuroimagers	would	argue	that	they	have	left	these	assumptions	behind	–	that	they	now	seek	to	understand	neural	circuits	and	not	merely	to	identify	brain	locales,	and	that	they	are	developing	measures	that	are	less	dependent	on	blood	oxygenation	as	a	proxy	(Lichtman	and	Denk,	2011).	However	one	only	has	to	scan	recent	papers	that	use	fMRI	in	claims	about	the	neural	bases	of	human	mental	life	to	see	the	persistence	of	these	two	assumptions.		
23		We	discuss	these	in	detail	in	Rose	and	Abi-Rached,	2013.	
24		BOLD	is	an	acronym	for	Blood	Oxygenation	Level	Dependent.	
25		Not	all	use	this	term	in	a	derisory	way:	https://theconversation.com/adventures-in-blobology-20-years-of-fmri-brain-scanning-4095	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
26		Over	the	last	five	years,	many	have	sought	to	go	beyond	blobology	to	‘connectomics’	and	have	used	fMRI	in	an	attempt	to	chart	functional	circuits	activated	in	particular	tasks	–	for	a	good	discussion	see	Biswal,	Mennes	et	al.,	2010.	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														27	Thus,	for	example,	while	there	is	a	significant	movement	of	researchers	committed	to	molecular	level	neuroimaging	–	for	example	those	associated	with	the	work	of	Henry	Wagner	(Wagner,	Burns	et	al.,	1983;	Wagner,	2006;	Wagner,	2009),	it	is	by	no	means	clear	that	the	molecular	gaze	is	the	most	appropriate	to	image	mental	functions.	
28		Most	of	the	researchers	themselves	tried	to	be	more	cautious,	for	example	speaking	of	‘neural	correlates’	of	mental	activity	while	an	individual	conducted	specific	tasks.		However	many	were	less	cautious	when	making	public	statements,	and	popular	interpreters	were	even	less	circumspect,	see	for	example	the	work	of	Rita	Carter	which	was	written	in	collaboration	with	eminent	neuroscientists	(Carter,	Aldridge	et	al.,	2009;	Carter	and	Frith,	2010).		And	even	when	reporting	the	caution	of	the	researchers,	headlines	tell	a	different	story,	for	one	recent	example	of	many,	see	http://www.livescience.com/37267-how-to-see-inside-the-mind.html	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
29		For	an	excellent	collection	of	papers	on	these	issues,	see	the	collection	edited	by	Melissa	Littlefield	(Littlefield,	2011).		I	have	already	mentioned	the	earlier	suggestions	that	NIRS	could	be	used	in	this	way,	and	there	is	a	significant	programme	of	research	on	this,	notably	by	researchers	in	a	number	of	Asian	countries	(e.g.	Ding,	Gao	et	al.,	2013;	Trinh,	2013;	Ding,	Sai	et	al.,	2014)	with	some	now	suggesting	that	the	technology	is	ready	for	real-	life	uses.		At	least	one	patent	application	has	been	lodged	in	the	US	for	a	method	using	NIRS	to	detect	a	‘suicide	terrorist’:	“This	method	can	be	advantageously	employed	at	various	security	check	sites,	such	as	airports,	train	stations,	or	any	other	sites	susceptible	of	terrorist	attacks	(Wu,	2013)	.		
30		http://www.larryfarwell.com/index.html	last	consulted	1.9.15.		Farwell	holds	several	patents	on	his	technology	dating	back	to	1994:	Method	and	apparatus	for	multifaceted	electroencephalographic	response	analysis	(MERA).	U.S.	Patent	#5,363,858	(1994);	Method	and	apparatus	for	truth	detection.	U.S.	Patent	#5,406,956	(1995);	Method	for	electroencephalographic	information	detection.	U.S.	Patent	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														#5,467,777	(1995);	Apparatus	for	a	classification	guilty	knowledge	test	and	integrated	system	for	detection	of	deception	and	information.	U.K.	Patent	#	GB2421329	(1997).	
31		http://www.noliemri.com/	last	consulted	1.9.15.		There	are	some	reasons	to	believe	that	this	organization	looms	rather	larger	in	the	imagination	of	ethicists	than	is	warranted	by	its	actual	commercial	or	juridical	presence.	
32		For	some	legal	debate	on	the	robustness	of	the	claims	made	by	CEPHOS,	see	https://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/2010/06/fmri-lie-detection-fails-its-first-hearing-on-reliability/	and,	for	the	2012	decision	by	the	US	Sixth	Circuit,	see	http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0312p-06.pdf		
33		There	are	many	studies	of	the	history	and	sociology	of	the	polygraph,	see	for	example	Cole,	2009;	Lynch,	Cole	et	al.,	2010.		
34		http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2009/06/features/guilty	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
35		The	judgment		(Selvi	&	Ors	vs	State	Of	Karnataka	&	Anr	on	5	May,	2010	concerned	a	group	of	criminal	appeals	against	convictions	using	these	technologies.			In	fact	the	test	in	question	here	was	the	so	called	BEAP	test	-	`Brain	Electrical	Activation	Profile	Test’	-		but	the	ruling	referred	to	all	such	tests:		http://indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/	-	thanks	to	Kriti	Kapila	for	directing	me	to	this	ruling.	
36		http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/archive/2009/06/features/guilty	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
37		http://www.noliemri.com/customers/Overview.htm	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
38		Farwell	continues	to	collaborate	with	the	FBI	in	his	research,	most	recently	co-authoring	a	study	with	FBI	employees	on	the	accuracy	of	his	P-300	and	P-300	MERMER	(Memory	and	Encoding	Related	Multifaceted	Electroencephalographic	Response)	technologies	in	detecting	the	presence	or	absence	of	particular	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														information	in	the	subjects	brain	(Farwell,	Richardson	et	al.,	2013).		This	paper	is	one	of	a	series	of	papers	now	being	published	based	on	research	conducted	with	“the	CIA,	the	FBI,	the	U.S.	Navy,	and	elsewhere”	now	that	security	concerns	have	apparently	been	resolved.	
39		See	the	video	made	to	mark	him	being	chose	as	one	of	Time	Magazine’s	Time	100	(in	2012):	the	100	innovators	who	may	be	the	Picassos	or	Einstein’s	of	the	21st	Century:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qwme8wiUTu8		
40		I	am	referring	here	to	US-VISIT	–which	links	biometrics	to	data	mining	from	multiple	databases	–	and	the	collection	and	mining	of	Passenger	Name	Record	(PNR)information	supplied	on	incoming	passengers.	
41	Though	see	the	patent	application	noted	above	that	proposes	that	NIRS	can	be	used	for	exactly	this	purpose.		
42		http://www.theguardian.com/science/2007/feb/09/neuroscience.ethicsofscience	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
43		At	the	same	time	as	the	Haynes	paper	was	causing	such	a	stir,	Geraint	Rees	of	University	College	London	was	involved	in	an	exhibition	at	the	Science	Museum	in	London	entitled	‘Neurobotics:	The	Future	of	Thinking’	and	is	pictured	on	the	website	for	the	exhibition	under	the	heading	“The	Mind	Reader”.		While	the	web	link	at		http://www.sciencemuseum.org.uk/antenna/neurobotics/private/121.asp	is	no	longer	active,	the	text	read	“How	would	you	feel	if	someone	could	read	your	innermost	thoughts?	Geraint	Rees	of	UCL	says	he	can.	By	using	brain-imaging	technology	he’s	beginning	to	decode	thought	and	explore	the	difference	between	the	conscious	and	unconscious	mind.	But	how	far	will	it	go?	And	shouldn’t	your	thoughts	remain	your	personal	business?”:	I	was	directed	to	this	exhibition	by	the	website	Global	Research:	http://www.globalresearch.ca/intrusive-brain-reading-surveillance-technology-hacking-the-mind/7606	last	accessed	1.9.15. 
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														44		These	studies	of	volition	all	extend,	but	do	not	question,	the	rather	bizarre	but	highly	influential	experiments	of	Benjamin	Libet	(Libet,	Gleason	et	al.,	1983;	Libet,	1985;	Libet,	Freeman	et	al.,	1999;	Libet,	2004):	these	are	discussed	in	detail	in	Rose	and	Abi-Rached,	2013.	
45	http://worldsciencefestival.com/videos/it_sounds_like_youre_talking_about_mind_reading	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
46		Koch	explained	this	finding	in	a	talk	at	the		World	Science	Festival	http://worldsciencefestival.com/videos/the_jennifer_aniston_brain_cell;	see	also	http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn7567-why-your-brain-has-a-jennifer-aniston-cell.html	-	last	accessed	1.9.15.		In	a	recent	article	in	National	Geographical	
Magazine,	the	discovery	of	the	Jenifer	Aniston	neuron	was	used	as	a	hook	on	which	to	hang	the	exposition	of	the	new	science	of	the	brain:	http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2014/02/brain/img/08-aniston-composite-670.jpg	last	accessed	1.9.15.	
47		Quoted	from	the	transcript	of	the	programme	which	can	be	found	at	http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-10131643-76.html	last	consulted	1.9.15.	
48	http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-10131643-76.html	last	consulted	1.9.15.	For	more	recent	work	by	Mitchell	and	Just,	using	their	technique	to	explore	the	presence	or	absence	of	‘self-representations’	in	those	diagnose	with	autism,	see	Just,	Cherkassky	et	al.,	2014.	
49		http://www.unwittingvictim.com/BrainMovieImage.html	last	consulted	1.9.15.		B	
50		See	also	http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/09/110922121407.htm	last	consulted	1.9.15.		For	a	recent	discussion	which	generalizes	from	these	experiments,	see	Huth,	Nishimoto	et	al.,	2012.	
51	http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2094671/Mind-boggling-Science-creates-decode-thoughts-words.html	 last	consulted	1.9.15.	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														52	http://www.nhs.uk/news/2012/02February/Pages/mind-reading-telephathy-inner-voice.aspx	last	consulted	1.9.15.	
53		In	2010,	much	publicity	was	given	to	a	study	from	Adrian	Own	and	his	group	at	Western	University	in	Canada,	seeming	to	demonstrate	the	possibility	of	using	such	techniques	to	identify	willful	thought	processes	in	patients	in	persistent	vegetative	states	(Monti,	Vanhaudenhuyse	et	al.,	2010).	The	potential	of	these	‘brain-computer	interfaces	is	discussed	in	detail	in	a	recent	report	from	the	Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics	(Nuffield	Council	on	Bioethics,	2013).			
54			For	other	experiments	along	the	same	lines,	see	Wang,	Collinger	et	al.,	2013.	and	for	a	more	general	discussion	on	progress	in	this	area,	see	Schwartz,	2013.	
55		The	experiment	with	the	rats	was	intended	to	be	a	step	towards	making	an	organic	computer.		It	was	reported	in	Nature	in	2013:	http://www.nature.com/news/intercontinental-mind-meld-unites-two-rats-1.12522:		Nicolelis	is	quoted	as	saying	““It’s	not	telepathy.	It’s	not	the	Borg,”	he	says.	“But	we	created	a	new	central	nervous	system	made	of	two	brains.”		
56	For	the	work	that	is	funded	in	the	Nicolelis	lab,	see	http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130311-ten-military-mind-experiments		
57		Reported	in	a	number	of	sources	in	October	2013,	e.g.	http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/darpa-developing-implant-to-monitor-brain-in-real-time/	;	http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenkotler/2014/09/02/neuro-modulation-2-0-new-developments-in-brain-implants-super-soldiers-and-the-treatment-of-chronic-disease/	.	
58		Few	would	suggest	that	we	are	on	the	verge	of	Jose	Delgado’s	‘Psychocivilized	Society’	but	it	is	relevant	to	point	out	that	his	‘stimoceivers’	–	which	could	both	remotely	monitor	the	electrical	activity	of	the	brain,	and	remotely	stimulate	specific	areas	of	the	brain	-		aimed	to	do	just	this,	although	with	much	cruder	technology	(Delgado,	Mark	et	al.,	1968;	Delgado,	1969).			Delgado’s	research	was,	also	funded	by	the	US	
																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														military.		In	the	future,	given	that	polygraphs	are	already	used	in	a	variety	of	ways	in	monitoring	sex	offenders,	one	might	imagine	these	technologies	being	developed	to	control	those	convicted	of	sexual	offences	against	children:	for	example,	perhaps	a	condition	of	release	from	confinement	under	licence	might	be	the	use	of	a	neural	implant	to	monitor	and	modulate	undesirable	thoughts	or	intentions		
59		Thanks	to	Des	Fitzgerald	for	making	this	point	to	me	in	more	or	less	these	exact	terms.	
60		Consider,	for	two	simple	examples,	Descartes’	medical	studies	and	his	concerns	with	using	medical	knowledge	to	ensure	his	own	health,	brilliantly	discussed	by	Steven	Shapin	(Shapin,	2000)	or	the	fascination	of	the	sensationalist	philosophers	such	as	Condillac	with	medical	innovations	in	which	sight	was	restored	to	people	who	had	been	blind	(I	discuss	these	in	Chapter	One	of	Rose,	1985).		Of	course,	as	Shapin	points	out,	the	relation	of	many	philosophers	to	the	medicine	of	their	times	has	often	been	very	critical,	although	such	attempts	to	reconstruct	medical	thought	and	practice	on	a	‘sound	philosophical	basis’	have	seldom	been	successful	-	as	Shapin	puts	it	the	“do	not	make	for	edifying	reading:	they	look	more	like	testaments	to	human	folly	than	to	the	power	of	reason”	(ibid.:	134).			Perhaps	there	is	a	lesson	here	for	some	of	our	contemporary	philosophical	critics	of	neuroscience.	
61	This	quote	is	from	the	exceptionally	dense	conclusion	to	this	book,	which	is	entitled	“From	Chaos	to	the	Brain”.			
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